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Abstract—Recently, physical layer security has been recognized
as a new design paradigm to provide security in wireless
networks. In contrast to the existing conventional cryptographic
methods, physical layer security exploits the dynamics of fading
channels to enhance security of wireless communications. This
paper studies optimization frameworks for a multicasting net-
work in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information
to a group of legitimate users in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers. In particular, power minimization and secrecy
rate maximization problems are investigated for a multicasting
secrecy network. First, the power minimization problem is solved
for different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers.
Next, the secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated
with the help of private jammers to improve the achievable
secrecy rates through a game theoretic approach. These jammers
charge the transmitter for their jamming services based on
the amount of interference caused to the eavesdroppers. For a
fixed interference price scenario, a closed-form solution for the
optimal interference requirement to maximize the revenue of the
transmitter is derived. This rate maximization problem for a non-
fixed interference price scenario is formulated as a Stackelberg
game in which the jammers and transmitter are the leaders
and follower, respectively. For the proposed game, a Stackelberg
equilibrium is derived to maximize the revenues of both the
transmitter and the private jammers. To support the derived
theoretical results, simulation results are provided with different
numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. In addition, these
results show that physical layer security based jamming schemes
could be incorporated in emerging and future wireless networks
to enhance the quality of secure communications.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, multicasting network,
convex optimization, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional wireless networks, security is achieved in the
upper layers based on conventional cryptographic methods.
However, some emerging networking paradigms present chal-
lenges in terms of key exchange and distribution. Recently,
physical layer based secret communication has received con-
siderable attention due to its suitability for dynamic network
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configurations and distributed processing techniques [1]–[3].
In addition, this approach implements security in the physical
layer as a complement to the cryptographic methods by
exploiting channel state information (CSI) of legitimate parties
as well as eavesdroppers.
The ideas behind physical layer security were first investi-
gated in [4] and [5] based on information theoretic concepts by
defining the secrecy capacity of wiretap and related channels.
Recently, multiantenna secrecy channels have received con-
siderable attention in the research community since the use
of multiple antennas yields spatial diversity and additional se-
crecy degrees of freedom [6]–[14]. In [6], the secrecy capacity
of multiple-antenna wiretap channels was presented under an
average power constraint, whereas the same secrecy capacity
was established in [7] as the saddle point solution to a min-max
problem. A transmit covariance matrix design was considered
in [8] to maximize the ergodic secrecy rate with a power
constraint for a multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap
channel model, whereas an optimal transmit design through the
semidefinite programming approach is proposed in [9] for the
same channel model as in [8]. In [10], full rank solutions have
been derived for the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel with an average power constraint and an
alternative solution based on Taylor series has been proposed
for the same problem in [11].
Cooperative jamming is a well known approach to further
improve secrecy rates, in which the jamming signals are
introduced at the eavesdropper with the help of relays or
jamming nodes [15]–[20]. This scheme degrades the eaves-
dropper’s capability of retrieving the information intended for
the legitimate users. The achievable rates and an efficient coop-
erative jamming protocol have been presented for the general
Gaussian multiple access and two-way wiretap channels in
[15]. In [16], different cooperative jamming strategies have
been developed for two-hop relay networks to confuse eaves-
droppers with the assumption of global CSI. Opportunistic
relaying for secret communications has been presented in [17]
through cooperative jamming and relay chatting, whereas full-
duplex jamming and optimal cooperative jamming for relays
have been proposed in [18] and [19], [20], respectively. On
the other hand, jamming signals can be embedded in the
transmitted signal from the legitimate transmitter to confuse
the eavesdroppers, a strategy known as the artificial noise
(AN) technique in the literature [21]–[23]. In [21], a more
general framework of AN methods has been presented for
multi-antenna nodes. An AN scheme based on spatial selection
has been proposed for MISO multi-evesdropper secrecy rate
maximization in [22] and a quality of service based beam-
forming scheme is has been proposed in [23] to employ AN.
Recently, game theoretic techniques have been incorporated
2into the study of secure wireless communications for decision
making and resource allocation, e.g., [24]–[30]. In [24], a
novel cooperative paradigm has been proposed to improve
the secrecy of primary users with the help of the secondary
users in cognitive radio networks through a Stackelberg game
approach. Secure games have been formulated for a secret
communication network with an unfriendly jammer through a
non-cooperative zero-sum continuous game in [25]. Physical
layer security has been also investigated in a two way untrusted
relay system through a Stackelberg game in [26]. In [27],
a game theoretic framework has been developed for multi-
hop networks in the presence of eavesdroppers. Transmission
strategies have been proposed for MIMO secret communica-
tion networks in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper
through game theoretic approaches in [28], whereas a secrecy
game for a Gaussian MISO interference channel has been
investigated in [29].
In this paper, we consider a secure multicasting network
as shown in Figure 1 where a transmitter broadcasts the
same information to multiple legitimate users. To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, only a few works have investigated
multicasting secrecy networks with multiple eavesdroppers. In
[31], multicasting secrecy rate maximization was investigated
for MISO channels with multiple eavesdroppers equipped with
multiple antennas based on convex approximation techniques,
whereas performance analysis has been derived for a secure
multicasting network consisting of a single-antenna transmitter
with multiple multi-antenna receivers as well as multiple
multi-antenna eavesdroppers in [32]. In [33], a multicarrier
based physical layer security scheme has been investigated
for multicasting systems and a waveform design has been
proposed for secure single-input single-output multicasting
transmission in [34]. Recently, different capacities have been
derived for secure multicasting in stochastic MIMO networks,
whereas a joint beamforming and user selection scheme has
been proposed for MISO wiretap channels with multiple
single-antenna eavesdroppers in [35]. However, secure mul-
ticasting communications with cooperative jamming has not
been considered in these works. In this paper, we propose
secrecy rate optimization frameworks with cooperative jam-
ming, in which a game theoretic approach is used to derive
the optimal strategies of the legitimate transmitter and the
jammers. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) Power minimization: We consider a beamforming design
for a secure communication network consisting of a
legitimate user and an eavesdropper, where our goal
is to minimize the transmit power with a secrecy rate
constraint. This problem can be easily formulated as
a second order cone programming (SOCP) problem.
Furthermore, we derive a closed-form optimal solution
based on the dual problem and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions. The derived optimal solution is val-
idated through a comparison with the SOCP results
via simulations. Next, the power minimization problem
is considered for a scenario with multiple legitimate
users and multiple eavesdroppers. This problem is not
convex in terms of the beamformer at the transmitter.
However, we formulate this problem as a semidefinite
programming problem by introducing a new variable and
also using semidefinite relaxation.
2) Game theory based secrecy rate maximization: In the
above power minimization schemes, the legitimate trans-
mitter requires a certain amount of transmit power to
satisfy the required secrecy rates. However, it is not
always possible to realize the predefined secrecy rates,
either because the available transmit power is limited
or because it might be expensive to use the required
amount of power. To overcome these issues, external
jammers can be employed to introduce interference to
the eavesdroppers, which will improve the achievable se-
crecy rate at the legitimate users. Therefore, we consider
a multicasting secrecy network with multiple legitimate
users and multiple eavesdroppers as shown in Figure
2 in which private jammers introduce interference to
the eavesdroppers. Particularly, these private jammers
charge the transmitter for their jamming service based on
the amount of interference caused at the eavesdroppers.
On the other hand, the legitimate users also pay the
transmitter according to their achieved secrecy rates,
which provides a profit to the transmitter and compen-
sates for the charges of the private jammers. Based on
the revenues at both transmitter and the private jammers,
we formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game in
which the private jammers and the transmitter are the
leaders and the follower, respectively. For the proposed
game, we derive a Stackelberg equilibrium solution with
different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers,
which maximizes the revenues of the transmitter as well
as the private jammers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is described in Section II. Section III presents the power
minimization problem with different numbers of legitimate
users and eavesdroppers. The Stackelberg game is introduced
in Section IV, whereas Stackelberg equilibrium solutions are
derived for the proposed game in Section V for different
scenarios. Section VI provides simulation results to support the
theoretical results. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
A. Notation
We use upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower
case boldface letters for vectors. ()H denotes conjugate trans-
pose. Tr() and Efg stand for the trace of a matrix and the
expectation of a random variable. A  0 indicates that A is
a positive semidefinite matrix. I denotes the identity matrix
of appropriate size. k  k2 represents the Euclidean norm of a
matrix. [x]+ denotes maxfx; 0g.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multicasting secrecy network with K le-
gitimate users and L eavesdroppers as shown in Figure 1,
where a transmitter broadcasts the same information to all the
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. It
is assumed that the transmitter is equipped with NT transmit
antennas, whereas each of the legitimate users and the eaves-
droppers has a single receive antenna. The channel coefficients
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Fig. 1: A multicasting secrecy network in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers.
between the legitimate transmitter and the kth legitimate user
and between the legitimate transmitter and lth eavesdropper
are denoted by hk 2 CNT1 and gl 2 CNT1, respectively.
Here, it is assumed that the transmitter has perfect CSI of
the legitimate users and the eavesdroppers. This assumption
is appropriate for the multicasting network being considered
here, in which potential eavesdroppers are also legitimate
members of the network, but do not have the permission to
receive a particular multicast content being protected. This
assumption has been widely used in the literature [2], [16],
[19], [23], [36]–[41]. The noise powers at the kth legitimate
user and the eavesdroppers are assumed to be 2k and 
2
e ,
respectively. The received signals at the kth legitimate user
and lth eavesdropper can be written as follows:
yk = h
H
k ws+ nk; yl = g
H
l ws+ nl; (1)
where s (Efs2g = 1), and w 2 CNT1 are the signal intended
to the legitimate users and the beamformer at the legitimate
transmitter, respectively. nk and nl denote the noise at the kth
legitimate user and lth eavesdropper, respectively. Assuming
additive white Gaussian noise, the achievable secrecy rate at
the kth legitimate user is given by [7]
Rk=

log

1+
wHhkh
H
k w
2k

 max
1lL
log

1+
wHglg
H
l w
2e
+
:
III. SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we consider the power minimization problem
for a multicasting secrecy network in which the transmitter
provides the required secrecy rates for all the legitimate users
in the presence of multiple active eavesdroppers. This problem
can be formulated as an optimization framework in which the
total transmit power is minimized to satisfy the secrecy rate
constraints.
A. Power Minimization
First, the power minimization problem is investigated with a
single legitimate user and an eavesdropper. For this problem, a
closed-form optimal solution can be derived based on the dual
problem and KKT conditions. For the scenario of multiple
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
it is formulated into a semidefinite programming framework
through semidefinite relaxation.
Single Legitimate User and Single Eavesdropper
With a single legitimate user and a single eavesdropper,
the power minimization problem can be formulated with the
secrecy rate constraint as follows:
min
w
kwk22
s.t. log

1+
wHh1h
H
1 w
21

 log

1+
wHg1g
H
1 w
2e

 Rs;(2)
where h1 and g1 are the channels between the legitimate
transmitter and legitimate user and between the legitimate
transmitter and the eavesdropper, respectively. In addition, Rs
is the required secrecy rate of the legitimate user. The problem
in (2) can be formulated into an SOCP problem. However,
we derive a closed-form optimal solution based on the dual
problem and KKT conditions. In the simulation section, we
validate this closed-form solution by comparing it with SOCP
results.
Lemma 1: The optimal solution of (2) is given by
w=
p
p ~w; ~w=
w1
kw1k2 ;w1=vmax

h^1h^
H
1  2 Rs g^1g^H1

p=s

2
Rs   1

; s =
1
max

h^1h^H1   2 Rs g^1g^H1
 ; (3)
where h^1 = h11 ; g^1 =
g1
e
and max(), vmax() denote the
maximum eigenvalue and the eigenvector corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue, respectively.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
Multiple Legitimate Users and Multiple Eavesdroppers
The power minimization problem with multiple legitimate
users and multiple eavesdroppers can be formulated as
min
w
kwk22
s.t. log

1+
wHhkh
H
k w
2k

 max
1lL
log

1+
wHglg
H
l w
2e

 Rk;
k = 1;    ;K; l = 1;    ; L; (4)
where Rk is the target secrecy rate of the kth legitimate user.
This problem is not convex in terms of the transmit beam-
former. However, by introducing a new semidefinite matrix
W = wwH and relaxing the rank-one constraint, the above
problem can be formulated into a semidefinite programming
(semidefinite relaxation problem) as follows:
min
W0
TrfWg
s.t. 1 + Trf~hk~hHk Wg   2 RkTrf~gl~gHl Wg  2 Rk ;
k = 1;    ;K; l = 1;    ; L; (5)
where ~hk = hkk and ~gl =
gl
e
. If the solution of the above
problem is rank-one, then it will be the optimal solution of
the original problem in (4). In case of a non-rank-one solution,
randomization techniques can be used to construct a rank-one
solution from the non-rank-one solution of (5) [42], [43].
IV. GAME THEORY BASED SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION
In order to satisfy the target secrecy rates, the transmitter
requires a certain amount of transmit power. However, it
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Fig. 2: A multicasting secrecy network with multiple
legitimate users, multiple eavesdroppers and private jammers.
is not always possible to provide the target secrecy rates
due to limited transmit power or because it might require a
significant amount of transmit power which will be infeasible
in terms of hardware implementations at the transmitter. On the
other hand, in multicasting networks, it is difficult to achieve
the target secrecy rates at different legitimate users with a
single beamformer. To overcome these issues, cooperative
jamming would be a solution, which will enhance the secrecy
performance at the legitimate users. Here, we consider a mul-
ticasting secrecy network in which a set of private (friendly)
jammers are employed to provide jamming services as shown
in Figure 2. These private jammers introduce interference to
the eavesdroppers who overhear the multicasting transmission
from the transmitter. In addition, these jammers ensure that
there is no interference leakage to the legitimate users, which
could be achieved by appropriately designing the beamformers
at the jammers and employing a dedicated jammer near to each
eavesdropper. Since, a dedicated jammer is closely located to
the corresponding eavesdropper, each eavesdropper receives
interference only from the corresponding private jammer1.
These private jammers charge the transmitter for their ded-
icated jamming service based on the amount of interference
caused to each eavesdropper. To compensate for these interfer-
ence prices, the legitimate transmitter also introduces charges
to the legitimate users for its enhanced secured service based
on the achieved secrecy rates. For this scenario, we consider
secrecy rate maximization with multiple legitimate users,
multiple eavesdroppers and multiple corresponding jammers.
We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game and then
investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game.
A Stackelberg game consists of two set of players, namely,
leaders and followers, where both of them try to maximize
their revenues or profits. The leaders make a move first
and then their followers will move according to the leaders’
strategy. The leaders (private jammers) announce a set of unit
interference prices for each eavesdropper. Then, the follower
(transmitter) decides on the interference requirements at the
eavesdroppers according to the interference prices.
1Here, it is assumed that the jammers have the perfect CSI of the
corresponding eavesdroppers. This is a reasonable assumption, for networks
in which the eavesdroppers are also part of the system [16], [19], [23].
A. Stackelberg Game
The interference received at the lth eavesdropper from the
corresponding private jammer can be written as follows:
Il = pljgjlj2; (6)
where jgjlj2 is the power gain between the corresponding
private jammer and the lth eavesdropper and the power al-
location at the lth private jammer is represented by pl. Here,
we are only interested in the power allocation policy at the
jammer, where the beamformer at the jammer is appropriately
designed with no interference leakage to the legitimate users
and hence interference is introduced only to the corresponding
eavesdropper.
The private jammers’ objective is to maximize their revenue
by selling interference to the transmitter. The revenue of the
lth private jammer can be written as follows:
l(l; pl) = lpljgjlj2; (7)
where l is the unit interference price charged by the corre-
sponding jammer to cause interference at the lth eavesdropper.
Depending on the interference requirement at the lth eaves-
dropper, the interference price should be determined by the
corresponding jammer to maximize its revenue. The prices for
interference at each eavesdropper can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem:
Problem (A): max
0
LX
l=1
l(l; pl); (8)
where  = [1   L] represents the interference prices for
all the eavesdroppers.
At the same time, the transmitter should maximize its utility
by introducing a price for secret communication established
between the transmitter and the corresponding legitimate users.
The revenue function at the transmitter can be written as
 L(p;) =
KX
k=1
kRk  
LX
l=1
lpljgjlj2; (9)
where k and Rk are the unit price for the secrecy rate and
the achievable secrecy rate at the kth user, respectively. In
addition, it is assumed that the unit price for the secrecy rate
for each user is fixed to a certain value. Hence, the transmitter
should determine the beamforming vector and decide on
the interference requirements at different eavesdroppers to
maximize its revenue. However, we are only interested in de-
termining the interference requirements at each eavesdroppers
for a given beamformer at the transmitter. This problem can
be formulated as follows:
Problem (B): max
p0
 L(p;); (10)
where p = [p1    pL] represents the power allocation policy
at all jammers.
Problem (A) and Problem (B) form a Stackelberg game,
in which the jammers (leaders) announce the interference
prices at each eavesdropper and then the transmitter (fol-
lower) determines the required amount of interference to each
eavesdropper. The solution of this game can be obtained
by investigating the Stackelberg equilibrium, at which the
5transmitter and the jammers come to an agreement on the
interference requirements and the interference price at each
eavesdropper. The deviation of either the transmitter or the
jammers from this equilibrium will introduce loss in their
revenues.
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is
defined as follows:
Stackelberg equilibrium: Let p be the optimal solution for
Problem (B), whereas  contains the best prices for Problem
(A). The solutions p and  define the Stackelberg equilib-
rium point if the following conditions are satisfied for any set
of p and :
 L(p
;) L(p;); l(pl ; l )l(pl ; l); 8 l:
V. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION
In this section, we derive Stackelberg equilibrium solutions
for the proposed game described in the previous section
with different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers.
First, the best response of the transmitter is derived in terms
of power allocation at the jammers for fixed interference
prices. Then, the optimal interference prices are obtained to
maximize the revenue of the jammers. In order to obtain
the Stackelberg equilibrium points, the best responses of the
follower (legitimate transmitter) and the leaders (jammers)
should be obtained by solving Problem (B) and Problem
(A), respectively. Since, the leaders (jammers) derive the
optimal interference prices determined by the interference
requirements from the legitimate transmitter, the best response
function of the follower should be derived first in terms of
the interference requirements. For the proposed game, the
Stackelberg equilibrium can be derived by obtaining p from
Problem (B) first and then by obtaining the best interference
prices  from Problem (A). In the following subsections, we
solve the proposed Stackelberg game with different numbers
of legitimate users and eavesdroppers.
A. Single Legitimate User and Single Eavesdropper
In this subsection, the proposed game is considered with a
single legitimate user and an eavesdropper. First, the optimal
interference requirement (best response) at the transmitter is
obtained to maximize its revenue for the fixed interference
price at the jammer. Then, a Stackelberg equilibrium is derived
for this game where both the legitimate transmitter and jammer
attain an equilibrium by achieving their maximum revenues.
Fixed Interference Price
Here, the optimal interference requirement is obtained for a
fixed interference price at the jammer. For a given beamformer
at the transmitter, the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate
user in the presence of an eavesdropper is defined as
RSL SE = log(1 + 0) log

1 +
1
2e + p11

; (11)
where
0 =
wHh1h
H
1 w
2
; 1 = w
Hg1g
H
1 w; 1 = jgj1j2: (12)
Hence, the optimal interference requirement at the eavesdrop-
per can be obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
p10
1RSL SE   1p11; (13)
where p1 is the power allocation policy at the corresponding
jammer. This problem is convex and the corresponding proof
has been provided in the next subsection. Hence, the optimal
power allocation can be obtained through standard interior
point methods [44]. However, we derive the closed-form
solution for the power allocation p1 to realize the Stackelberg
equilibrium in the following subsection.
Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium
with a legitimate user and an eavesdropper. To obtain this
equilibrium, the best response (i.e., p1) of the follower (trans-
mitter) is derived for a given interference price (1), since the
leader (jammer) derives its best response from the interference
requirement decided by the follower (transmitter). Note that a
closed-form solution for the best response should be obtained
to derive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game.
The best response of the follower can be obtained by solving
the following problem:
max
p10
 SL-SE(p1; 1); (14)
where  SL-SE(p1; 1) is the revenue function for the transmitter
and is defined in (15) at the top of the next page. 1 and 1 are
the unit prices for the secrecy rate at the legitimate user and
the price for the interference introduced at the eavesdropper.
The optimal interference requirement for a given w and 1
can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
p10
1

log(1+0) log

1 +
1
2e + p11

 1p11;(16)
where
0 =
wHh1h
H
1 w
21
; 1 = w
Hg1g
H
1 w and 1 = jgj1j2: (17)
Lemma 2: The optimal interference requirement from the
jammer with a given interference price 1 is given by
p1 =
1
1
24s21
4
+
11
1
  (2
2
e + 1)
2
35+ (18)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. 
Corollary 1: With a given w and 1, the interference
price 1 is bounded as follows:
1  11
2e (2e + 1)
: (19)
Since p1  0,s
21
4
+
11
1
 (2
2
e + 1)
2
) 1  11
2e (
2
e + 1)
:(20)
We have thus obtained the optimal interference requirement at
the eavesdropper to maximize the revenue of the legitimate
transmitter. The jammer should announce the optimal unit
6 SL-SE(p1; 1) = 1

log

1 +
wHh1h
H
1 w
21

  log

1 +
wHg1g
H
1 w
2e + p11

  1p11 (15)
interference price 1 to maximize its revenue by selling the
interference to the transmitter. The optimal unit interference
price can be obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
10
1(p

1; 1) = 1p

11 (21)
Lemma 3: The optimal unit interference price 1 is given as
follows:
1 =
c2
2c1
"
c0p
c20   c1
  1
#
; (22)
where
c0 =
 
22e + 1

21
; c1 =
21
421
and c2 =
11
21
: (23)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. 
Hence, a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game with
a single legitimate user and an eavesdropper is (p1; 

1). Any
deviation from this equilibrium point will cause loss to both
the follower (legitimate transmitter) and leader (jammer).
Hence, both of them will operate at this Stackelberg
equilibrium to maximize their revenues.
Proposition 1: There is a unique Nash equilibrium for
the proposed game and the derived Stackelberg equilibrium
solution achieves this unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: As mentioned before, the revenue function of
the legitimate transmitter is a concave function of the power
allocation policy at the jammer. Hence, the optimal and
unique jammer power allocation policy has been derived for
a given interference price. Similarly, the revenue function
of the jammer is also a concave function in terms of the
interference price which results in an optimal and unique
interference price. Since, both solutions are unique and
optimal, this equilibrium achieves a unique Nash equilibrium
for the proposed game. 
B. Multiple Legitimate Users and Single Eavesdropper
In this subsection, we extend the proposed game to the sce-
nario with multiple legitimate users and a single eavesdropper.
As in the previous subsection, first, the optimal interference
requirement is obtained for a fixed interference price and then,
a Stackelberg equilibrium is derived for the proposed game.
Fixed Interference Price
The achievable secrecy rate of the ith user can be defined
as
R
(i)
ML SE = log(1 + i) log

1 +
e
2e + p21

; (24)
where
i =
wHhih
H
i w
2
; e = w
Hg1g
H
1 w 1 = jgj1j2: (25)
The optimal power allocation policy at the jammer for a fixed
interference price can be formulated as
max
p10
KX
i=1
iR
(i)
SL ME   1p21; (26)
Lemma 4: The optimal power allocation policy at the jammer
to maximize the revenue at the legitimate transmitter is given
by
p2 =
1
1
2664
vuut2e
4
+
e
PK
i=1 i

1
  (2
2
e + e)
2
3775
+
(27)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. 
Stackelberg Game
In order to derive the Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple
legitimate users and an eavesdropper, the best response of
jammer should be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
20
1(p

2; 2) = 2p

21 (28)
Lemma 5: The optimal unit interference price 2 is given as
follows:
2 =
c2
2c1
"
c0p
c20   c1
  1
#
; (29)
where
c0 =
 
22e + e

21
; c1 =
2e
421
and c2 =
e
PK
i=1 i
21
: (30)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3. 
Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game
with multiple legitimate users and single eavesdropper is
defined as (p2; 

2).
C. Single Legitimate User and Multiple Eavesdroppers
Here, the proposed game is investigated with a single
legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers. This problem is
different from the above problems due to the fact that there are
the multiple active eavesdroppers. As in the previous subsec-
tion, first the fixed-interference scenario is solved, followed by
the derivation of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed
game.
Fixed Interference Prices
The achievable secrecy rate with multiple eavesdroppers can
be defined as
RSL ME = log(1 + 0)  max
1iL
log

1 +
i
2e + pii

; (31)
where
0 =
wHh1h
H
1 w
2
; i = w
Hgig
H
i w; i = jgjij2: (32)
Note that all the eavesdroppers may not necessarily influ-
ence the achievable secrecy rate at the legitimate user. The
eavesdropper with the highest achieved rate will determine the
7achieved secrecy rate of the legitimate user. By introducing
jamming to this eavesdropper, the secrecy rate can be im-
proved by reducing the achievable rate at the corresponding
eavesdropper. After this jamming, another eavesdropper might
now have the highest achievable rate which will deteriorate
the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user. Hence, it
is important to jam this eavesdropper in order to match the
achieved rate of the previous eavesdropper. Therefore, only
a subset of eavesdroppers require the interference from the
jammers and the rest of them do not need any interference
from the jammers, since their impact on the secrecy rate is
not dominant. Here, we divide these eavesdroppers into two
sets, namely, super-active and non-super-active eavesdroppers.
The eavesdroppers who receive interference from the jammers
and determine the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate
user are called super-active eavesdroppers and the rest of
them are defined as non-super active eavesdroppers. In order
to improve the revenue of the legitimate transmitter, the
optimal interference requirements problem can be formulated
as follows:
max
p0
1RSL ME  
X
i2K
ipii; (33)
where the vector p = fpini 2 Kg represents the power
allocations of private jammers in the set K consisting of all
super-active eavesdroppers. The optimal interference require-
ments from private jammers corresponding to the super-active
eavesdroppers can be obtained by formulating the problem as
follows:
max
p0; ti; t0
1 [log(1 + 0)  t0] 
X
i2K
ipii
s.t. log

1 +
i
2e + pii

 ti; i 2 K
maxftini 2 Kg = t0; ti  0; i 2 K:
(34)
The problem in (34) is convex in p and can be easily solved
by interior point methods. However, one issue that might arise
is how to obtain the super-active eavesdroppers’ set K from
all available active eavesdroppers. This can be addressed by
solving the following optimization problem:
max
p0; ti; t0
1 [log(1 + 0)  t0] 
LX
i=1
ipii
s.t. log

1 +
i
2e + pii

 ti; 8 i
maxft1;    ; tLg = t0; ti  0; 8 i; (35)
where the super-active eavesdroppers’ set K is removed and
all the available eavesdroppers have been incorporated into
the optimization problem.
Proposition 2: At the optimal solution of (35), the achieved
rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., ti; i 2 K)
will be equal and power allocations pis of non-super-active
eavesdroppers (i.e., i =2 K) will be all zeros.
Proof : Assume that ti; i 2 K are not equal. Let consider
the minimum ti = tmin < t0 from all ti; i = 1;    ; L, and
the corresponding pi will be higher than that of tmin = t0.
Hence, the revenue of the transmitter (cost function of (35))
with ti = tmin will be less than that with ti = t0. Thus,
the achieved rates of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e.,
ti; i 2 K) will be equal at the optimal solution and the power
allocations strategy corresponding to the non-super-active
eavesdroppers (i.e., i =2 K) will be zeros. 
Therefore, the optimal interference requirements from
the private jammers with fixed interference prices can be
obtained by solving the convex problem in (35).
Stackelberg Game
As in the previous subsections, this problem is formulated as
a Stackelberg game and the Stackelberg equilibrium is defined
for the proposed game. The best response of the transmitter
for a given set of interference prices can be determined by
solving the following problem:
max
p0
1RSL ME  
X
i2K
ipii; (36)
where p represents power allocations of the private jammers
in the set K which is the set consisting of all the super-active
eavesdroppers. This problem can be formulated into a convex
problem as in (35) and the optimal power allocation strategy
can be obtained. However, it is necessary to find a closed-form
solution to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed
game.
Lemma 6: The optimal power allocation policy at the ith
jammer is given by
pi =
1
i

i
0
  2e
+
; (37)
where
i = w
Hgig
H
i w
0 =
PK
i=1 ii+
rPK
i=1ii

41+
PK
i=1 ii

21
(38)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. 
The optimal interference requirement has been derived
to maximize the transmitter’s revenue for a given set of
interference prices. However, the jammers should announce
their optimal interference prices to maximize their revenues.
The optimal interference price can be obtained by solving the
following problem:
max
0
LX
l=1
i(p

i ; i) =
LX
l=1
ip

ii: (39)
By substituting the optimal power allocations pi s in (37) in
terms of the interference prices is, the above optimization
problem can be rewritten as
max
0
2664 21PKi=1 iiPK
i=1 ii+
rPK
i=1ii

41+
PK
i=1 ii
   2e KX
i=1
i
3775
+
(40)
8It is very difficult to find a closed-form solution for the optimal
interference prices is and the problem in (40) generally must
be solved using existing numerical methods. However, we can
find a closed-form solution if we assume that each private
jammer announces the same interference prices (i.e., 1 =
2 =    = L = 0). For this uniform interference price
scenario, the optimization problem in (40) can be modified as
max
00
2664 210PKi=1 i
0
PK
i=1 i+
r
0
PK
i=1i

41+ 0
PK
i=1 i
  K2e0
3775
+
(41)
Lemma 7: The optimal interference price 0 in (41) is given
by
0 =
1
2
h
 41K21 + 21
p
K22 + 4K2421
i
K22
(42)
where
1 =

1 +
K2
c2

; 2 =
 
c2 +K
2 ; c2 = KX
i=1
i: (43)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. 
The Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed uniform price
game with a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdroppers
is given by (pi 8 i; 0). By using this equilibrium solution,
both the legitimate transmitter and the jammers achieve their
maximum revenues.
D. Multiple Legitimate Users and Multiple Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, the proposed game is extended to the
scenario with multiple legitimate users and multiple eaves-
droppers. As in the previous subsections, the fixed interference
price scenario and Stackelberg game are investigated.
Fixed Interference Prices
The achievable secrecy rate of the ith user can be defined
as
R
(i)
ML ME = log

1 + 
(i)
0

  max
1iL
log

1 +
i
2e + pii

; (44)
where

(i)
0 =
wHhih
H
i w
2
; i = w
Hgig
H
i w: (45)
As mentioned in the previous subsection, all the eavesdroppers
might not be active due to the different achieved rates. By
considering only super-active eavesdroppers, the optimal inter-
ference requirements can be obtained by solving the following
problem:
max
p0
KX
i=1
iR
(i)
SL ME  
X
i2K
ipii; (46)
where the vector p represents power allocations of private
jammers in the set K which is the set consisting of all the
active eavesdroppers. As in the previous subsection, the opti-
mal interference requirements can be obtained by considering
both super-active and non-super-active eavesdroppers through
the following problem:
max
p0; ti; t0
KX
i=1
i
h
log

1 + 
(i)
0

  t0
i
 
LX
i=1
ipii
s.t. log

1 +
i
2e + pii

 ti; 8 i
maxft1;    ; tLg = t0; 8 i; ti  0; 8 i;(47)
At the optimal solution of (47), the achieved rates of the
super-active eavesdroppers will be equal and power allocations
corresponding to the non-super-active eavesdroppers will be
zeros, where the corresponding proof is similar to that of
Proposition 2.
Stackelberg Game
Here, we solve the Stackelberg game for the scenario with
multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers. The
derivation of the Stackelberg equilibrium is similar to that
of the scenario with a single legitimate user and multiple
eavesdroppers. The best response of the legitimate transmitter
can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
p0
KX
i=1
iR
(i)
ML ME  
X
i2K
ipii; (48)
where the vector p consists of all the power allocations of
the jammers corresponding to the super-active eavesdroppers.
Lemma 8: The optimal power allocation strategy at the
ith jammer is given by
piML ME =
1
i

i
1
  2e
+
; (49)
where
i = w
Hgig
H
i w
1=
PK
i=1 ii+
rPK
i=1ii

4
PK
i=1 i+
PK
i=1 ii

2
PK
i=1 i
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6. 
For this interference requirement, the jammers should
determine their optimal interference prices to maximize their
revenues which can be obtained by solving the following
problem:
max
0
KX
i=1
i(p

i ; i) =
LX
i=1
ip

ii: (50)
However, it is difficult to find a closed-form optimal solution
for the problem in (50) with different interference prices is
at each jammer. In the case of the uniform interference price
(i.e.,1 = 2 =    ; L = 0), the problem in (50) can be
modified as follows:
max
00
20c3c2
0c2+
p
0c2 (4c3+ 0c2)
 K2e0 (51)
where
c2=
KX
i=1
i; c3=
KX
i=1
i: (52)
9Lemma 9: The optimal interference price 0 is given by
ML ME =
1
2
h
 4K2c31 + 2c3
p
K22 + 4K2421
i
K22
(53)
where
1=1 +
K2
c2
; 2=c2 +K
2: (54)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 7. 
Hence, a Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game
with multiple legitimate users and multiple users is defined
by (piML ME ; 8 i; ML ME) which provides the maximum
revenues for both the legitimate transmitter and the private
jammers.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to support the
theoretical results derived in the previous sections. In order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, we
consider a multicasting secrecy network in which the trans-
mitter broadcasts the same information to all the legitimate
users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In addition,
private jammers are employed to confuse the eavesdroppers
by introducing interference in order to improve the secrecy
rates at the legitimate users. The legitimate transmitter is
equipped with three antennas, whereas the legitimate users
and the eavesdroppers have a single-antenna. The unit secrecy
rate price has been set to 5 (i.e., 1 = 5). In this secrecy
network, all channels have been generated using zero-mean
circularly symmetric independent and identically distributed
complex Gaussian random variables. The noise power at all
the terminals has been assumed to be 0.1.
A. Power Minimization
In this subsection, we provide simulation results to support
the closed-form results derived in (3) for the scenario with
a single legitimate user and an eavesdropper. As mentioned
before, the original power minimization problem can be
formulated into a convex optimization (SOCP) framework.
However, we derived a closed-form solution in (3). We have
obtained the required transmit power and the corresponding
beamformer based on the closed-form solution as well as the
convex optimization framework for different sets of channels
as provided in Table 1 where the target secrecy rate has been
set to 3.5. As seen in Table 1, both results are the same which
validates the accuracy of the closed-form solution in (3). Due
to space limitations, the performance for the corresponding
beamformers as well as the simulation results for the case
with multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers are
not provided here.
B. Fixed Interference Prices
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes with private jammers, where the legitimate
transmitter is charged with fixed interference prices. The
simulation results are provided with different numbers of
legitimate users and eavesdroppers.
Channels Required Transmit Power
Closed Form Convex Optimization
Channel 1 1.1610 1.1610
Channel 2 1.3431 1.3431
Channel 3 1.2069 1.2069
Channel 4 0.7455 0.7455
Channel 5 0.6082 0.6082
TABLE 1: The required transmit power for the closed-form
and convex optimization based solutions.
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Fig. 3: The revenue of the legitimate transmitter against
power allocation at the private jammer for different channels
with fixed interference price (i.e., 1 = 1).
Single Legitimate User and Single Eavesdropper
A secrecy network with a single legitimate user and an
eavesdropper is considered in which a private jammer in-
troduces interference to the eavesdropper by charging the
legitimate transmitter with a price of one (i.e., 1 = 1)
for unit interference. First, we validate the concavity of the
revenue function of the legitimate transmitter (f(p1) in (60))
in terms of the power allocation (p1) at the private jammer and
then simulation results based optimal power allocations are
obtained to support the theoretical derivations. Figure 3 shows
the revenue function of the legitimate transmitter for different
sets of channels for a fixed interference price. As seen in
Figure 3, the revenue functions are concave for different sets of
channels, which validates the proof of the convexity of f(p1)
provided in Appendix B. On the other hand, Table 2 presents
the optimal power allocation policy at the private jammer, the
achieved secrecy rate and the corresponding revenue of the
legitimate transmitter obtained through theoretical and simu-
lation results. As seen in Table 2, the theoretical and simulation
results are identical, which demonstrates the accuracy of the
derivations in (18). In addition, the optimal power allocations
at the jammer corresponding to the maximum revenue at
transmitter in Figure 3 is the same as the theoretical results in
Table 2 for the five channels considered in this simulation.
Hence, these results confirm the optimality of the derived
results for the scenario of the single legitimate user and the
single eavesdropper.
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Channels Power Allocation:Jammer
Achieved
Secrecy Rate
Revenue:
Legitimate Transmitter
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 1.1809 1.2000 1.6445 1.6458 7.8207 7.8206
Channel 2 1.5019 1.5000 2.0534 2.0531 8.9325 8.9325
Channel 3 3.5984 3.6000 2.0505 2.0507 7.4198 7.4198
Channel 4 0.9452 1.0000 1.9921 2.0041 8.6606 8.6583
Channel 5 2.4107 2.4000 1.8168 1.8152 7.2427 7.2427
TABLE 2: The optimal power allocation policy of the private jammers with fixed interference prices 1 = 1, achievable
secrecy rates and revenues of legitimate transmitter for single legitimate transmitter and single eavesdropper obtained from
the closed-form solution and simulation for different sets channels.
Channels Power Allocation:Jammer 1
Power Allocation:
Jammer 2
Achieved
Secrecy Rate
Revenue:
Legitimate Transmitter
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 0.3324 0.3324 0.7457 0.7458 2.7083 2.7241 13.0855 12.8145
Channel 2 0.1264 0.1264 0.5729 0.5430 3.3334 3.3223 15.2002 15.2016
Channel 3 3.3886 3.3889 1.0284 1.0284 2.8085 2.8234 13.4161 13.4203
Channel 4 1.1613 1.1614 1.0441 1.0442 2.9185 2.9296 13.7907 13.7928
Channel 5 0.2778 0.2778 2.0209 2.0211 3.2938 3.2949 15.1031 15.1031
TABLE 3: The optimal power allocation policy of the private jammers with fixed interference prices 1 = 1 and 2 = 3,
achievable secrecy rates and revenues of legitimate transmitter. The unit price for the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate
user is 5 (1 = 5).
Single Legitimate User and Multiple Eavesdroppers
Here, we consider a multicasting secrecy network with a
single legitimate user and two eavesdroppers. The price used
by the jammers to charge the legitimate transmitter is 1 and 3
(i.e., 1 = 1; 2 = 3), respectively, for unit interference. Simi-
lar to the previous simulations, first, we validate the convexity
of the revenue function of the legitimate transmitter in (35)
in terms of power allocations (i.e., p1 and p2) at the private
jammers for different sets of channels. Then, the correctness of
the derived theoretical results is supported through numerical
results. Figure 4 depicts the revenue functions of the legitimate
transmitter for Channel 1 provided in Table 3 which confirms
the convexity of the revenue function in terms of power
allocation policy at the jammers. In addition, Table 3 provides
the theoretical and simulation based optimal power allocations
at the private jammers which maximize the revenue of the
transmitter for five sets of channels. As seen in Table 3, the
theoretical and simulation results are indistinguishable, which
validates the derivation of the closed-form power allocations
in (37). On the other hand, the maximum revenue from Figure
4 is the same as that of Channel 1 in Table 3 with the same
power allocations at the private jammers. This confirms the
optimality of the results obtained in Table 3 for different sets
of channels. Note that we have only presented the revenue of
the transmitter for Channel 1 in Figure 4; however, the rest of
the channels in Table 3 provide similar results. We have not
presented those results here due to space limitations.
C. Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we validate the equilibrium of the pro-
posed Stackelberg games for different numbers of legitimate
users and eavesdroppers.
Single Legitimate User and Single Eavesdropper
To support the derived Stackelberg equilibrium, a secrecy
network with a single legitimate user and an eavesdropper is
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Fig. 4: The revenue of the legitimate transmitter for Channel
1 with different power allocations at both the private
jammers for fixed interference prices.
considered. First, for different sets of channels, the revenue
function of the jammer is evaluated with different interference
prices as shown in Figure 5. These results confirm that
the jammer revenue function is concave with respect to the
interference price (i.e., 1) and support the proof provided in
Appendix C. The choices for the optimal interference prices
and the maximum revenues of the jammers are provided in
Table 4, which verifies the accuracy of the analytical results.
The Stackelberg equilibria (p1; 

1) for the proposed game are
also presented in Table 4. These validate the derived unique
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game through simulation re-
sults, where both the transmitter and the private jammer will
come to an agreement to maximize their revenues.
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Channels Interference Price (1): Revenue of Jammer:
Stackelberg Equilibrium:
(p1; 

1)
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 4.4313 4.4000 0.5534 0.5530 (0:3670; 4:4313)
Channel 2 8.5462 8.5000 2.2242 2.2240 (0:2929; 8:5462)
Channel 3 5.6251 5.6000 3.6714 3.6715 (0:8291; 5:6251)
Channel 4 8.5640 8.6000 2.1736 2.1735 (0:1863; 8:5640)
Channel 5 7.8066 7.8000 2.8496 2.8495 (0:4779; 7:8066)
TABLE 4: The optimal interference prices and revenues of the private jammer as well as Stackelberg equilibrium for
different sets of channels. The unit price for the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate user is 5 (1 = 5).
Channels Interference Price: Revenue of Jammers: Stackelberg Equilibrium:
(p1; p

2; 

0)
Derivation Simulation Derivation Simulation
Channel 1 4.0721 4.1000 1.5381 1.5378 (0:0677; 0:3070; 4:0721)
Channel 2 2.1647 2.2000 0.5372 0.5378 (0:3076; 0:6900; 2:1647)
Channel 3 2.6639 2.7000 0.7088 0.7084 (0:1501; 1:0917; 2:6639)
Channel 4 3.1023 3.1000 0.8887 0.8892 (0:1501; 0:6996; 3:1023)
Channel 5 4.0322 4.0000 1.4932 1.4935 (2:5895; 0:7858; 4:0322)
TABLE 5: The optimal interference prices and revenues of the private jammers as well as Stackelberg equilibrium for
different sets of channels. The unit price for the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate user is 5 (1 = 5).
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Fig. 5: The revenue of the jammer with a single legitimate
user and a single eavesdropper for different sets of channels.
Single Legitimate User and Multiple Eavesdroppers
In order to validate the proposed Stackelberg equilibrium,
the same secrecy network as in the fixed interference price
case is considered with a single legitimate user and multiple
eavesdroppers. First, we evaluate the revenue function of
the legitimate transmitter (f(0)) in (76) in terms of 0 for
different sets of channels. Figure 6 plots the revenues of the
legitimate transmitter versus 0 with fixed interference prices
(i.e., 1 = 1; 2 = 3) for different sets of channels. This
confirms the derivation of the convexity of f(0) (Appendix
D) in terms of 0. In addition, the achievable maximum
revenues are the same as the derived solutions represented
in Table 5. Next, we evaluate the achievable revenues of the
jammers with different interference prices where it is assumed
that the all the jammers introduce the same interference price
(i.e., 1 = 2 = 0). Figure 7 plots the revenues of the
jammers versus the interference price 0 for different sets
of channels which confirms the convexity of the revenue
of the jammers in the interference price 0 (Appendix E).
Table 5 provides the theoretical and simulation based optimal
interference prices (i.e., 0s) and corresponding revenues of
the jammers for the proposed Stackelberg game with different
sets of channels, where the theoretical results are the same as
the simulated results. In addition, Stackelberg equilibria of the
proposed game are also provided in Table 5. The deviation of
the legitimate transmitter and jammers from this equilibrium
solution will introduce a loss in their corresponding revenues
as evidenced by Figures 6 and 7.
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Fig. 6: The revenue of the transmitter in terms of 0 with
fixed interference prices for different sets of channels.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed optimization techniques
for a multicasting secrecy network. For the scenario with a
single legitimate user and a single eavesdropper, a closed-
form solution has been derived for the power minimization
problem based on the corresponding dual problem, whereas
it was formulated as a semidefinite programming problem in
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Fig. 7: The revenue of the jammer with different interference
prices for different sets of channels.
the case with multiple legitimate users and multiple eaves-
droppers. On the other hand, optimization problems have been
considered for a multicasting secrecy network with jammers
to improve the achievable secrecy rates. These private jam-
mers introduce charges for their jamming service. For fixed
interference prices, we have derived the optimal interference
requirements for different numbers of legitimate users and
eavesdroppers. For non-fixed interference prices, we have
formulated the optimization problem into a Stackelberg game
in which jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and
follower, respectively. A Stackelberg equilibrium has been
developed for the proposed game with different numbers of
legitimate users and eavesdroppers. To validate the derived
theoretical results, simulation results have been provided for
a variety of scenarios.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The original power minimization problem in (2) can be
written without of loss of generality as
min
p;~w
p~wH ~w
s.t.
~wH

I+ ph^1h^
H
1

~w
~wH
 
I+pg^1g^H1

~w
2 Rs ; ~wH ~w=1; p0;(55)
where h^1 = h11 and g^1 =
g1
e
. In order to obtain the optimal
solution of (55) (i.e., ~w; p), we derive the corresponding
dual problem. The Lagrangian of (2) can be defined as
L(w;s)=w
Hw+s
h
2
Rs
 
1+wH g^1g^
H
1 w
 1+wH h^1h^H1 wi ;
where s is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
secrecy rate constraint. The corresponding dual problem can
be defined as
max
s0
s
 
2Rs 1 ; s.t. Z,I s^hh^H 2 Rs g^H1 g^10:(56)
The constraint in (56) means that the matrix Z should have
at least one zero eigenvalue. On the other hand, s can take
the maximum to satisfy the positive semidefinite constraint in
(56) as
s =
1
max

h^h^H   2 Rs g^H1 g^1
 ; (57)
where max() denotes the maximum eigenvalue of its ar-
gument. The original problem in (2) can be formulated as
a convex problem. Hence, strong duality holds between the
original problem in (2) and the corresponding dual problem
in (56). The required minimum power to achieve the secrecy
rate constraint is
p = s

2
Rs   1

: (58)
On the other hand, the optimal w should be in the null space
of Z:
w1 = vmax

h^h^H   2Rs g^H1 g^1

; ~w =
w1
kw1k2 ; (59)
where vmax() denotes the the eigenvector corresponding to
the maximum eigenvalue. Hence the optimal solution of (2)
can be expressed as in (3). This completes the proof for Lemma
1. 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first show that the problem in (16) is a convex problem
by showing that the following function is concave in p1:
f(p1)=1

log(1+0) log

1+
1
2e+p11

 1p11: (60)
The concavity of this function can be shown by finding the
second derivative respect to p1 as follows:
@f(p1)
@p1
=
111
(2e + p11 + 1)(2e + p11)
  11 (61)
@2f(p1)
@p21
=   111
 
221p1 + 21
2
e + 11

[21p
2
1 + (2
2
e + 1)1p1 + 12e + 4e ]
2 : (62)
Since @
2f(p1)
@p21
< 0, f(p1) is a concave function in terms of p1.
Hence the optimal solution should satisfy the KKT conditions
as follows [44]:
@f(p1)
@p1
=
111
(2e + p11 + 1)(2e + p11)
  11 = 0: (63)
By arranging the terms of (63), we obtain the following:
12p21 +
 
22e + 1

1p1 + 1
2
e + 
4
e   11
1
= 0: (64)
By solving this equation, the optimal power allocation policy
p1 at the jammer is obtained as p1  0,
p1 =
1
1
24s21
4
+
11
1
  (2
2
e + 1)
2
35+ : (65)
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The problem in (21) can be proven to be a convex problem
by showing the following function is concave in the interfer-
ence price 1 for p1(> 0) in (18):
f(1) = 1
r
c1 +
c2
1
  c0

; (66)
where c0; c1 and c2 are defined in (23). This function can be
shown to be concave by finding its second derivative respect
13
to 1 as follows:
@f(1)
@1
=

c1 +
c2
1
 1
2
  c2
21

c1 +
c2
1
  1
2
  c0 (67)
@2f(1)
@21
=   c
2
2
431

c1 +
c2
1
  3
2
: (68)
Hence the second derivative of f(1) with respect to 1 is
negative (i.e., @
2f(1)
@21
< 0), and f(1) is a concave function
in 1. In addition, the optimal interference price 1 should
satisfy the KKT conditions as follows [44]:
@f(1)
@1
=

c1 +
c2
1
 1
2
  c2
21

c1 +
c2
1
  1
2
  c0 = 0: (69)
By rearranging the (69), we obtain the following:
4c1
 
c20   c1

21 + 4c2
 
c20   c1

1   c22 = 0: (70)
By solving the above equation, the optimal interference price
1 to maximize the jammer’s revenue is obtained as 1 > 0,
1 =
c2
2c1
"
c0p
c20   c1
  1
#
: (71)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 6
With the optimal power allocation in (34), the achieved rates
of the super-active eavesdroppers (i.e., i 2 K) will be equal
as stated in Proposition 2. Hence, the power allocation at the
ith private jammer can be written as
i
2e + pii
= 0;=) pi = 1
i

i
0
  2e
+
: (75)
The original optimization problem in (34) can be formulated
in terms of 0 as follows:
max
00
1 [log(1 + 0) log(1+0)]  1
0
KX
i=1
ii+
2
e
KX
i=1
i
, f(0) (76)
The optimal 0 should satisfy the KKT conditions and there-
fore we obtain the following:
@f(0)
@0
=  1
1+0
+

20
;
@2f(0)
@20
=
1
(1+0)2
  2
30
; (77)
where  =
PK
i=1ii. The function f(0) is concave if the
following condition is satisfied:
30
(1 + 0)2
 2
1
: (78)
Hence, the optimal 0 can be obtained if 1 is large enough
to satisfy the above condition. This means that the legitimate
transmitter should charge the legitimate user a reasonable
price to make a profit by introducing interference to the
eavesdroppers with the help of the private jammers. However,
the optimal 0 should satisfy the KKT conditions
@f(0)
@0
= 0.
The optimal 0 can be obtained by solving the following
equation:
1
2
0   0
KX
i=1
ii 
KX
i=1
ii = 0; (79)
and 0 > 0,
0 =
PK
i=1 ii +
rPK
i=1 ii

40+
PK
i=1 ii

21
: (80)
Hence the optimal power allocation policy of the ith can be
written as
pi =
1
i

i
0
  2e
+
: (81)
This completes the proof of Lemma 6. 
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We first show that the revenue function of the jammers in
(41) is concave in terms of 0 for pi > (0) in (37) and then we
derive the optimal interference price 0. The revenue function
of the jammers is defined as
f(0) =
210c1
0c1+
p
0c1 (41+ 0c1)
 K2e0; (82)
where c1 =
PK
i=1 i. The concavity of f(0) can be proven
by finding the second derivative with respect to 0 as in (72),
which is at the top of the next page. In order to prove that the
function in (82) is concave, we need to show that the second
derivative (i.e.,@
2f(0)
@20
) is negative. This has been proved in
(73) and (74) which are at the top of the next page. This
confirms that the revenue function of the jammers is concave
in 0 and the optimal 0 should satisfy the KKT conditions
@f(0)
@0
= 0 [44]:
21c1
0c1 + q
 
21c10

c1 +
c210+21c1
0c1+q

(0c1 + q)
2 = 0; (83)
0 =
1
2
h
 41K21 + 21
p
K22 + 4K2421
i
K22
:
This completes the proof of Lemma 7. 
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